# 1NC

### Framework

**Fairness—The affirmative’s willful refusal to defend the resolution is an act to exclude the negative from meaningful participation in the dialogue.**

**Galloway, 7** –professor of communication at Samford University (Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, *Contemporary Argumentation and Debate,* Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: *Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions* (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

**Fairness outweighs any affirmative offense—norms are vital because they allow both teams to be heard in a meaningful way. Debate as dialogue is vital to refine and develop positions, test ideas and is a prerequisite to meaningful political participation is net more emancipatory than the affirmative.**

**Galloway, 7** –professor of communication at Samford University (Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, *Contemporary Argumentation and Debate,* Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

A second reason to reject the topic has to do with its exclusivity. Many teams argue that because topicality and other fairness constraints prevent particular speech acts, debaters are denied a meaningful voice in the debate process. Advocates argue that because the negative excludes a particular affirmative performance that they have also precluded the affirmative team. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it views exclusion as a unitary act of definitional power. However, a dialogical perspective allows us to see power flowing both ways. A large range of affirmative cases necessitates fewer negative strategies that are relevant to the range of such cases. If the affirmative can present any case it desires, the benefits of the research, preparation, and in-depth thinking that go into the creation of negative strategies are diminished, if not eviscerated entirely. The affirmative case is obliged to invite a negative response. In addition, even when the negative strategy is not entirely excluded, any strategy that diminishes argumentative depth and quality diminishes the quality of in-round dialogue. An affirmative speech act that flagrantly violates debate fairness norms and claims that the benefits of the affirmative act supersede the need for such guidelines has the potential of excluding a meaningful negative response, and undermines the pedagogical benefits of the in-round dialogue. The “germ of a response” (Bakhtin, 1990) is stunted. While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the affirmative also relies upon an unstated rule to exclude the negative response. This unstated but understood rule is that the negative speech act must serve to negate the affirmative act. Thus, affirmative teams often exclude an entire range of negative arguments, including arguments designed to challenge the hegemony, domination, and oppression inherent in topical approaches to the resolution. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way. Ground is just that—a ground to stand on, a ground to speak from, a ground by which to meaningfully contribute to an ongoing conversation. Conversely, in a dialogical exchange, debaters come to realize the positions other than their own have value, and that reasonable minds can disagree on controversial issues. This respect encourages debaters to modify and adapt their own positions on critical issues without the threat of being labeled a hypocrite. The conceptualization of debate as a dialogue allows challenges to take place from a wide variety of perspectives. By offering a stable referent the affirmative must uphold, the negative can choose to engage the affirmative on the widest possible array of “counterwords,” enhancing the pedagogical process produced by debate. Additionally, debate benefits activism by exposing the participants to a wide range of points of view on topics of public importance. A debater starting their career in the fall of 2005 would have debated about China, landmark Supreme Court decisions, Middle East policy, and agricultural policy. It is unsurprising that many debaters contend that debate is one of the most educationally valuable experiences of their lives. Thus, the unique distinctions between debate and public speaking allow debaters the opportunity to learn about a wide range of issues from multiple perspectives. This allows debaters to formulate their own opinions about controversial subjects through an in-depth process of research and testing of ideas. Putting the cart before the horse by assuming that one knows that the resolution is oppressive and cannot be meaningfully affirmed denies debaters the ability to craft a nuanced answer to the question posed by the resolution.

### Nietzsche

#### The Affirmative regurgitates past pain and suffering to show themselves as a moral option in an immoral world. This action is a stimulant used to mask real pain with surplus enjoyment, creating charred men where we feel but are not alive.

**Zupancic 03** [alenka, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two,” 47-49]

It might seem that the notion of the ascetic ideal, as well as Nietzsche’s analysis and criticism of it, somehow belongs to the past, and has no particular relevance to our largely hedonistic “postmodern condition.” Yet this assumption could not be more erroneous. The hedonism of postmodern society, far from representing a step out of the framework of what Nietzsche calls the ascetic ideal, is deeply rooted in this framework. In order to see this, we must first understand that, for Nietzsche, the asceticism involved in the ascetic ideal does not simply involve a renouncement of enjoyment; it involves, above all, a specific mode or articulation of enjoyment. Moreover, one could even say that the ascetic ideal coincides with the very “invention” of enjoyment: enjoyment as different from pleasure, as something which lies—to use Freud’s term—beyond the pleasure principle. If, according to Nietzsche, all great religions are an answer to man’s feelings of displeasure and pain, they never treat the cause of this displeasure. Instead, they soothe the sensation of displeasure— they soothe it by providing an even stronger sensation. They literally “outscream” the displeasure (and the “depression”—this is Nietzsche‘s term—linked to it) with an even sharper and more acute feeling, on account of which we no longer feel the previous displeasure. The religious (and especially Christian) cure for “depressive discomfort” comes not in the form of an analgesic or a tranquilizer, but, rather, in the form of an “irritating drug” or “excitation-raiser,” a stimulant. The ascetic ideal, writes Nietzsche, is employed to produce orgies of feeling) 2 It is about immersing the human soul in terrors, ice, flames, and raptures to such an extent that it is liberated from all petty displeasure, gloom, and depression) 3 This is the very core of the ascetic ideal: Everywhere the bad conscience, that “abominable beast,” as Luther called it; everywhere the past regurgitated, the fact distorted, the “jaundiced eye” for all action; . everywhere the scourge, the hair shirt, the starving body, contrition; everywhere the sinner breaking himself on the cruel wheel of a restless morbidly lascivious conscience; everywhere dumb torment, extreme fear, the agony of the tortured heart, convulsions of an unknown happiness . . : awake, everlastingly awake, sleepless, glowing, charred, spent and yet not weary—thus was the man, “the sinner,” initiated into *this* mystery. This ancient mighty sorcerer in his struggle with displeasure, the ascetic priest—he had obviously won, his kingdom had come: one no longer protested against pain, one thirsted for pain; “more pain! more pain!”1” In a word, one could say that the thing the ascetic ideal employs in response to displeasure is jouissance, (surplus-) enjoyment: “morbidly lascivious conscience,” “convulsions of an unknown happiness,” and the fundamental imperative: More! Encore! It also invents the “second body”: a sublime body, sleepless and spent, as if charred, but never weary. Nietzsche repeats this insistently: the ascetic ideal is about excitement—it is, so to speak, a “passion diet”; it is not about moderation, it counters passions with a surplus of pure passion. It might be interesting to note that this problematic is very closely connected to the one discussed by Eric Santner in his book On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzwei. Santner starts from the notion that life—or, taken more narrowly, the psyche—is characterized by a constitutive “too-muchness” (the human mind is defined by the fact that it includes more reality than it can contain—it bears an excess, a “too-muchness” of pressure that is not merely physiological). This “too-muchness” of pressure cannot be done away with, but it can take two different forms or paths: it can be either the agent of our engagement “in the midst of life,” or a defense against such engagement. The line between the two, between the passions infusing our engagement in the world and our defenses against such engagement, is often a thin one. The common path is precisely the one that constrains our capacities “by burdening them with an uncanny sort of surplus animation. We are dealing here with a paradoxical kind of mental energy that constrains by means of excess that leaves us stuck and paralyzed precisely by way of a certain kind of intensification and amplification." This effect, which Santner calls “undeadening,” is generative of a disturbing surplus animation, and is not “unlike the king’s ‘second body’ posited by theorists of sovereignty.”16 What Nietzsche discusses under the name of the ascetic ideal is precisely this kind of passion, in which man is awake—supremely awake, animated and immersed in very strong sensations and feelings—but not alive. The word that Nietzsche uses to express this (a charred man) is very eloquent in itself. In this respect, Nietzsche’s diagnosis is quite contrary to Marx’s diagnosis: religion is not so much the opium of the people, a tranquilizer that constitutes an escape from (harsh) reality, as an “excitation-raiser” which binds us to this reality by activating some mortifying passion. Discomfort is soothed (or silenced) by crises and states of emergency in which a subject feels alive. But this “alive” is nothing other than “undeadness,” the petrifying grip of surplus excitation and agitation. Of course, Nietzsche also often talks about the “opium” dimension of religion: the fairytale about life after death, about the existence of another, better world, about the existence of a righteous judge who can make sense of the often senseless and unfortunate vicissitudes of our daily life. But he does not situate the core of religious mastery (the ascetic ideal) in this dimension. The power and strength of religion (in the form of the ascetic ideal) do not spring from the fact that it promises the suffering and the disappointed a better world in exchange for their faith, thus forcing them to accept and endure the miseries of this world (instead of rising against their causes). Pain and suffering are not simply burdens that a true Christian (who, in Nietzsche’s argument, can very well be an “atheist Christian”) stoically endures; they are, rather, something in relation to which a Christian comes to life as a subject. The core of the ascetic ideal lies in its articulation of the economy of enjoyment that—although it needs a reference to a beyond in order to be operative—operates in this “corporeal” world: it is that it mobilizes and motivates souls, and provides them with enjoyment

#### The desire to mask suffering with enjoyment is the ascetic ideal par excellence. the aff’s morals are employed to make on feel accomplished by their personal restraints.

**Zupancic 03** [alenka, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two,” 47-49]

The ascetic ideal places the Real of pleasure in enjoyment (and posits enjoyment of pain or suffering as the most vivd human experience – an experience in which the degree of self-sensation and self-presence attains its highest intensity, producing a kind of paralyzing wakefulness), and makes it a law. The specificity of this enjoyment-enjoining law—for this is precisely what this law is all about—is that **it** does not allow for any play of transgression: **it** does not capture us by means of arousing a transgressive desire to which we cling as to a promise of some secret enjoyment. It is not a law with which we could establish some kind of relationship, situating ourselves as subjects in relation to **it.** It is a law that leaves nothing outside it**,** for now, writes Nietzsche, a man is “like a hen imprisoned by a chalk line. He can no longer get out of this chalk cl7 He can, however, rotate in it to infinity: the limit and the infinite are not in contradiction here, since itis the limit itself that is infinite. It is tempting to say that something was in the air in that second half of the nineteenth century, something that brought Nietzsche to his conceptualization of the ascetic ideal and Freud to his theory of the superego. Lacan’s reading of the superego law in terms of the “imperative of enjoyment” is, of course, very significant in this context. Something has changed in the juncture of Law and enjoyment, in their nexus. Of course, Nietzsche recognizes this mode of enjoyment in the whole history of Christianity; he does not conceive of itas of something that has just recently occurred. Nonetheless, this is the fate (and the power) of most concepts: once they are forged, we can easily recognize their elements in past historical formations, or even in other, older concepts. This, however, does not contradict the fact that Nietzsche writes from the perspective of a certain shift or break that befell the history of Christianity (or, more broadly, of Western civilization as based on Christianity), and that **it** is only in this break that things that “were there all the time” became visible. With the term “ascetic ideal,” Nietzsche names the passage from one logic of the law to another, a passage from the law that forbids and regulates enjoyment to the law that commands (not pleasure, but) enjoyment, confronting us with an imperative of enjoyment. Actually, **it** would be more accurate to say that the two sides of the law—the prohibition of enjoyment and the surplus of enjoyment— were always linked together, mutually supporting each other. (Surplus-) enjoyment is not simply something that is suppressed or repressed by the law. The prohibition of enjoyment equals the creation of a “beyond” where surplus-enjoyment (although forbidden) finds its place. This “beyond” is the very thing from which the law draws its power to attach us, since the law really functions not when it manages to hold us simply by fear of its authority, but when we adhere to it through a specific mode of (our) enjoyment. The “shift” mentioned above concerns the fact that this other side of the law (its “back side”) becomes its front side. Or, perhaps more precisely: (surplus-) enjoyment is no longer a hidden support of the law; rather, it becomes one with the law, as if a kind of short circuit between the two had been established. This could also be expressed in terms of what, in his book *Homo* sacer, Giorgio Agamben develops at the political level: modern politics is characterized by the fact that the “state of emergency” (the state that is, at one and the same time, the exception to as well as the support of the rule of law) is itself becoming a rule of law. Thus, the crucial feature of the ascetic ideal does not consist in the fact that the law (as the imperative of duty and self-denial) constitutes a weapon with which we are to fight our passions and drives; the law does not exactly “suppress” the drives and the passions. The problem and power of the ascetic ideal lie in the fact that it is only through it that passion actually “runs wild,” and becomes limitless. In paragraph 229 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche designates the “fear of the ‘wild, savage beast” (i.e. the fear of what, in men, is supposed to be lawless and animal-like) as superstition. The belief according to which there is some primary “wildness” in man (a wildness that has to be transformed by means of culture and spirit) is an empty belief. If there is a “pure passion” to be found in the history of Christianity (as the essential bearer of the ascetic ideal), it is to be found on the side of the Law, on the side of the ascetic ideal itself. In the struggle against sensuality and corporeality, in the “dissection of conscience,” there is an “abundant, overabundant enjoyment [GenuB].”8 And “high culture” is based on the deepening and spiritualizing of cruelty: “that ‘wild beast’ has not been killed off at all, it lives and thrives, and it has only — made a divinity of itself...” It is only with the (Christian) law that sensuality as such gets invented. This was Kierkegaard’s thesis, but for Kierkegaard it basically means that, in contrast to the Greek individuality that strove for a balance between the spiritual and the sensual, Christianity, as the affirmation of the spiritual principle, also established its Other: it excluded the sensual, and thus merely granted it its autonomous existence.2° Nietzsche’s emphasis is slightly different: with the formation of the ascetic ideal, the sensual is not simply the Other of the law, but becomes the very thing that the law gives form to—it becomes one with the law. (The ascetic ideal “is employed to produce orgies of feeling,” as Nietzsche puts it.) The fundamental gesture of the ascetic ideal in relation to the sensual is not exclusion but, rather, something like a complete appropriation, an inclusion without any remainder. The sensual itself takes on the form of the law. If, on the one hand, the purely sensual or boundless passion is a fiction generated by the law (i.e. a fiction of an otherness sustained by the law), it is, on the other hand, the very Real of the law. Pure sensuality (passion, pleasure, voluptuousness) is nothing but the law itself. The law becomes the only Real (in the sense of the only source of excitation, passion, pleasure, and pain): the pleasures that remain outside (it) are, strictly speaking, “null” and “void” in relation to the (overabundant) pleasure that the law provides, gives body to, and enjoins. In this context, the assertion about the “nullity of pleasures” (outside the frame of the ascetic ideal) is not simply empty ideological talk, flatly contradicted by the Real of human experience. The triumph of the ascetic ideal consists precisely in the fact that, at some point, it conquers the very soil of “real human experience.” Before this, the pleasure might well have been dispersed, chaotic, without clear boundaries; yet this does not meant that it was infinite and boundless before the law set limits to it. On the contrary, the law (of the ascetic ideal) is the very name for limitless pleasure, for the enjoyment that became infinite and fathomless. In the ascetic ideal, the law is not something that sets limits to passion, restraining and regulating it. Instead, it is the very outlet of passion. It is the passion of the infinite or an infinite passion—even though it takes the form of an infinite passion to set limits, to purify, to narrow the circle around the pure. The only (now existing) infinite passion is the passion that takes on the form of the law. Precisely as the struggle against displeasure (in response to which it employs enjoyment), Christianity is also a struggle against pleasure, defined exactly as that which, in enjoyment, is not real (“fleeting pleasures,” “passing voluptuousness”) but “illusory.” And the genuine triumph of the ascetic ideal comes when people themselves (atheists included) actually and personally begin to feel that such pleasure is indeed “empty,” “null” and “illusory—that is to say, when it is no longer necessary for all kinds of church authorities to preach about it. This is why the ascetic ideal attains its climax (or becomes what it is) only after the “death of God.” I have already indicated the proximity of these arguments to some of Freud’s claims from Civilization and *Its* Discontents. What Nietzsche analyzes under the name of “ascetic ideal” corresponds, almost point by point, to what Freud calls the superego, the law of an insatiable passion. The more we obey it, the more we sacrifice to it—the more it wants, and the more it gains in strength and severity. We are dealing with the same image of vampirism that is also present in Nietzsche: the (superego) law literally feeds on the drives, devouring their “blood,” and ultimately becoming the only real locus of enjoyment. It could be said that the superego itself comes to be “structured like a drive.” It is common knowledge that Freud posits a kind of temporal paradox at the very core of the superego and the moral conscience linked to it: the renouncement of the drives creates conscience, and conscience demands the renouncement of the drives.2’ In this way, the very form of renouncing becomes a form of enjoyment, a mode of its organization. This is especially blatant in obsessional neurosis, in which Freud recognizes the paradigm of “religious” thinking.

#### Our alternative is to forget about the suffering in the 1ac. the pain cited by the 1ac is only attended to by the memory of the 1ac to further asceticism, only a break away from these memories solves.

**Zupancic 03** [alenka, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two,” 57-60]

This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”? Nietzsche claims that memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”21 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain” that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure, In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”), Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act. Forgetting, oblivion, is the very condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word. Memory (the “historical”) is eternal sleeplessness and alert insomnia, a state in which no great thing can happen, and which could even be said to serve this very purpose. Considering the common conception according to which memory is something monumental that “fixes” certain events, and closes us within their horizon, Nietzsche proposes a significantly different notion. It is precisely as an eternal openness, an unceasing stream, that memory can immobilize us, mortify us, make us incapable of action. Nietzsche invites us to imagine the extreme example of a human being who does not possess the power to forget. Such a human being would be condemned to see becoming everywhere: he would no longer believe in his own being, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, and would lose himself in this stream of becoming. He would be like the true student of Heraclitus. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly historical manner would be like someone forced to go without sleep.28 Memory holds us in eternal motion—it keeps opening numerous horizons, and this is precisely how it immobilizes us, forcing us into frenetic activity. Hence, Nietzsche advances a thesis that is as out of tune with our time as it was with his own: “every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful only within a defined horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and too selfish, in turn, to enclose its own perspective within an alien horizon, then it will feebly waste away or hasten to its timely end.”29 Of course, Nietzsche’s aim here is not to preach narrow-mindedness and pettiness, nor is it simply to affirm the ahistorical against history and memory. On the contrary, he clearly states that it is only by thinking, reflecting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing (i.e. only by means of the power to utilize the past for life, and to reshape past events into history) that the human being becomes properly human. Yet, in the excess of history, the human being ceases to be human once again, no longer able to create or invent. This is why Nietzsche insists that “every great historical event” is born in the “ahistorical atmosphere,” that is to say, in conditions of oblivion and closure: Imagine a man seized and carried away by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea; how his world changes’ Looking backward he feels he is blind, listening around he hears what is unfamiliar as a dull, insignificant sound; and those things that he perceives at all he never before perceived in this way; so palpable and near, colorful, resonant, illuminated, as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All his valuations are changed and devalued;. . . It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings; a tiny whirlpool of life in a dead sea of night and oblivion; and yet this condition—ahistorical, antihistorical through and through— is not only womb of the unjust deed, but of every just deed as well; and no aftist will create a picture, no general win a victory, and no people gain its freedom without their having previously desired and striven to accomplish these deeds in just such an ahistorical condition. . Thus, everyone who acts loves his action infinitely more than it deserves to be loved, and the best deeds occur in such an exuberance of love that, no matter what, they must be unworthy of this love, even if their worth were otherwise incalculably great.3° If we read this passage carefully, we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,” instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion, we tend to forget and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not, if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and mortify our (new) passion. It could also be interesting to relate Nietzsche’s reflections from the quoted passage to the story of Hamlet, in which the imperative to remember, uttered by Hamlet’s father’s Ghost, plays a very prominent role. Remember me! Remember me!, the Ghost repeats to Hamlet, thus engaging him in the singular rhythm that characterizes the hero of this play—that of the alternation between resigned apathy and frenetic activity or precipitate actions (his killing of Polonius, as well as that of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern; his engagement in the duel with Laertes . . .). This movement prevents Hamlet from carrying out the very deed his father’s Ghost charges him with. Many things have been said and written about the relationship between action and knowledge in this play, and about how knowledge prevents Hamlet from acting. Although the two notions are not unrelated, it might be interesting to consider this also in terms of memory (not only in terms of knowledge). It could be worthwhile to contemplate the role played by the imperative of memory. Could we not say that one of the fundamental reasons for the difficulty of Hamlet’s position is precisely the structural incompatibility of memory and action— that is to say, the fact that action ultimately always “betrays” memory? And do we not encounter something similar in the wider phenomenon of melancholy (in the play, Hamlet is actually said to be “melancholic”) as a never-ending grief that keeps alive, through pain, the memory of what was lost? Additionally, although we can recognize in this kind of melancholy a form of fidelity (for instance—to use Nietzsche’s words—fidelity to “a woman or a great idea”), this kind of fidelity, bound to memory, should be distinguished from fidelity to the very event of the encounter with this woman or idea. Contrary to the first form, this second form of fidelity implies and presupposes the power to forget. Of course, this does not mean to forget in the banal sense of no longer remembering the person or the idea in question, but in the sense that forgetting liberates the potential of the encounter itself, and opens up—precisely through its “closure”—the possibility of a new one.

### Stirner

#### The aff’s call to moral action is a form of self-enslavement wherein we adopt their abstract ethical standing as our fixed identity, depriving us of individualism.

**Stirner 45** – Philosopher (Max, nom de plum of Johann Kaspar Schmidt, “Die Einzige und Sein Eigentum”, 1845, First Edition, translated by Steven T. Bryington, ed. Benjamin R. Tucker)

It is very true, "**He who abides in love** abides in God, and God in him." (1 John 4:16.) God abides in him, he does not get rid of God, **does not become godless; and he abides in God**, **does not come to himself** and into his own home, abides in love to God and does not become loveless. "God is love! All times and all races recognize in this word the central point of Christianity." God, who is love, is an officious God: **he cannot leave the world in peace, but wants to make it blest**. "God became man to make men divine.'' He has his hand in the game everywhere, and nothing happens without it; everywhere he has his "best purposes," his "incomprehensible plans and decrees." Reason, which he himself is, is to be forwarded and realized in the whole world. **His fatherly care deprives us of all independence**. We can do nothing sensible without its being said, God did that, and can bring upon ourselves no misfortune without hearing, God ordained that; we have nothing that we have not from him, he "gave" everything. **But,** as God does, so does Man. God wants perforce to make the world blest, and Man wants to make it happy, to make all men happy. Hence every "man" wants to awaken in all men the reason which he supposes his own self to have: everything is to be rational throughout. **God torments himself with the devil**, and the philosopher does it with unreason and the accidental. God lets no being go its own gait, and Man likewise wants to make us walk only in human manner. But **whoso is full of sacred** (religious, moral, humane) **love loves only the fixed idea**, the "true man," **and persecutes** with dull mercilessness **the individual**, the real man, under the phlegmatic legal title of measures against the "un-man." He finds it praiseworthy and indispensable to exercise pitilessness in the harshest measure; for **love to the fixed idea** or generality **commands him to hate him who is not ghostly**, the egoist or individual; such is the meaning of the renowned love-phenomenon that is called "justice." The criminally arraigned man can expect no forbearance, and no one spreads a friendly veil over his unhappy nakedness. Without emotion the stern judge tears the last rags of excuse from the body of the poor accused; without compassion the jailer drags him into his damp abode; without placability, **when** the time of **punishment has expired, he thrusts the branded man** again **among** men, his **good, Christian,** loyal **brethren**, **who contemptuously spit on him**. Yes, **without grace a criminal** "deserving of death" **is led to the scaffold**, and **before** **the** eyes of a jubilating **crowd the appeased moral law** celebrates its sublime - revenge. For only one can live, the moral law or the criminal. Where criminals live unpunished, the moral law has fallen; and, where this prevails, those must go down. Their enmity is indestructible. […]**Pauperism is the valuelessness of me**, **the phenomenon that I cannot realize value from myself**. For this reason state and pauperism are one and the same. The state does not let me come to my value, and continues in existence only through my valuelessness: it is forever intent on getting benefit from me, exploiting me, turning me to account, using me up, even if the use it gets from me consists only in my supplying a proles (proletariat ); it wants me to be "its creature." **Pauperism can be removed only when I as ego realize value from myself,** **when I give my own self value,** **and make my price myself.** I must rise in revolt to rise in the world.

#### This moralist Crusader-identity produces Verstimmung, a hatred of life and a dissatisfaction with Identity.

**Newman 5** (Saul Newman, Research fellow at UWA, political theorist, Ph.D. from University of New South Wales, “Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought: New Theories of the Political” 2005 <<http://zinelibrary.info/files/Newman%20-%20Power%20and%20Politics%20in%20Poststructuralist%20Thought%20-%20New%20Theories%20of%20the%20Political.pdf>>)

For both Stirner and Nietzsche, the problem with liberalism and its various political offshoots is that they deny individual difference and uniqueness by reducing everyone to the same formal level on the basis of an idealized and universal image of human essence. The Feuerbachian image of a god-like man – imbued with rationality and goodness – is for Nietzsche, as well as for Stirner, an inverted image of the sacrifice of the individual on the humanist altar of self-mortification. Perhaps, in other words, we should look beyond the formal liberal principle of equal rights to see the spirit of *ressentiment* that infects its root – the will to power of the weak against the strong, of the slave against the master, that lies beneath it. This attitude of ***ressentiment***, Nietzsche shows, is hostile to difference – it **cannot understand difference except by incorporating it within its moral structures and defining it in oppositional terms**. Thus, what is different to itself is necessarily bad, precisely because without this external other it could not define itself as good. Perhaps we could understand liberalism in this sense – as a political logic infected by a resentment of difference and individuality. As Stirner shows, individuals who deviate from the accepted moral and rational norms of liberalism are excluded from the liberal polity. This may be seen in terms of an institutionalized **attitude of resentment towards that which is different or other – that which does not conform to the ideal liberal subject**. Moreover, in liberal societies, the **individual himself is split between an identification with liberal subjectivity, and a recognition of those elements of himself which do not or cannot conform to this ideal, and which are seen as pathological, inhuman and are often violently repressed**. The individual is thus alienated and ‘terrified at himself’ (Stirner 1995: 41). In this way, **resentment is turned against** oneself and becomes a sickness. Stirner’s un-man refers not only to differences outside the modern liberal subject, but to those within him as well. We can easily apply this argument to modern liberal societies, in which particular identities – such as the unemployed, drug addicts, the homeless, psychiatric patients, illegal immigrants and welfare-dependents – are marginalized because they do not live up to the liberal ideal of the autonomous, independent, responsible, self-reliant subject. A whole series of punishments, disciplinary procedures and social sanctions are applied to those who fall behind: welfare breaches, prison sentences, fines, court injunctions, medicalization, confinement in psychiatric wards or detention centres. William Connolly analyses this reactive intolerance of difference characteristic of today’s liberal societies. By constructing the liberal subject as responsible and autonomous, liberalism inculcates a sense of rancour and guilt against the self where it fails to meet this standard; this can only be alleviated by directing it outwards so that it becomes a generalized resentment against those who are perceived as different: ‘Certain weakness is here transformed into merit, so that what the slave *must be* becomes the standard against which every difference is defined as a deviation to be punished, reformed or converted’ (Connolly 1991: 79).

#### We have no fundamental human identity – the alternative is to reject the fixed ontology of the 1AC. In doing so, we become a Creative Nothingness of identity, taking part in the process of Becoming.

**Stirner 45** – Philosopher (Max, nom de plum of Johann Kaspar Schmidt, “Die Einzige und Sein Eigentum”, 1845, First Edition, translated by Steven T. Bryington, ed. Benjamin R. Tucker)

All Things Are Nothing To Me [I've set my cause on nothing / Ich hab' mein' Sach' auf nichts gestellt] What is not supposed to be my concern [Sache] ! First and foremost, the good cause [Sache], then God's cause, the cause of mankind, of truth, of freedom, of humanity, of justice; further, the cause of my people, my prince, my fatherland; finally, even the cause of Mind, and a thousand other causes. Only my cause is never to be my concern. ''Shame on the egoist who thinks only of himself!" Let us look and see, then, how they manage their concerns - they for whose cause we are to labour, devote ourselves, and grow enthusiastic. You have much profound information to give about God, and have for thousands of years "searched the depths of the Godhead," and looked into its heart, so that you can doubtless tell us how God himself attends to "God's cause," which we are called to serve. And you do not conceal the Lord's doings, either. Now, what is his cause? Has he, as is demanded of us, made an alien cause, the cause of truth or love, his own? You are shocked by this misunderstanding, and you instruct us that God's cause is indeed the cause of truth and love, but that this cause cannot be called alien to him, because God is himself truth and love; you are shocked by the assumption that God could be like us poor worms in furthering an alien cause as his own. "Should God take up the cause of truth if he were not himself truth?" He cares only for his cause, but, because he is all in all, therefore all is his cause! But we, we are not all in all, and our cause is altogether little and contemptible; therefore we must "serve a higher cause." - Now it is clear, God cares only for what is his, busies himself only with himself, thinks only of himself, and has only himself before his eyes; woe to all that is not well pleasing to him. He serves no higher person, and satisfies only himself. His cause is - a purely egoistic cause. How is it with mankind, whose cause we are to make our own? Is its cause that of another, and does mankind serve a higher cause? No, mankind looks only at itself, mankind will promote the interests of mankind only, mankind is its own cause. That it may develop, it causes nations and individuals to wear themselves out in its service, and, when they have accomplished what mankind needs, it throws them on the dung-heap of history in gratitude. Is not mankind's cause - a purely egoistic cause? I have no need to take up each thing that wants to throw its cause on us and show that it is occupied only with itself, not with us, only with its good, not with ours. Look at the rest for yourselves. Do truth, freedom, humanity, justice, desire anything else than that you grow enthusiastic and serve them? They all have an admirable time of it when they receive zealous homage. Just observe the nation that is defended by devoted patriots. The patriots fall in bloody battle or in the fight with hunger and want; what does the nation care for that? By the manure of their corpses the nation comes to "its bloom"! The individuals have died "for the great cause of the nation," and the nation sends some words of thanks after them and - has the profit of it. I call that a paying kind of egoism. But only look at that Sultan who cares so lovingly for his people. Is he not pure unselfishness itself, and does he not hourly sacrifice himself for his people? Oh, yes, for "his people." Just try it; show yourself not as his, but as your own; for breaking away from his egoism you will take a trip to jail. The Sultan has set his cause on nothing but himself; he is to himself all in all, he is to himself the only one, and tolerates nobody who would dare not to be one of "his people." And will you not learn by these brilliant examples that the egoist gets on best? I for my part take a lesson from them, and propose, instead of further unselfishly serving those great egoists, rather to be the egoist myself. God and mankind have concerned themselves for nothing, for nothing but themselves. Let me then likewise concern myself for myself, who am equally with God the nothing of all others, who am my all, who am the only one [Der Einzige]. If God, if mankind, as you affirm, have substance enough in themselves to be all in all to themselves, then I feel that I shall still less lack that, and that I shall have no complaint to make of my "emptiness." I am not nothing in the sense of emptiness, but **I am the creative nothing** [das schöpferiche Nichts], **the nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything**. **Away, then, with every concern that is not altogether my concern**! You think at least the "good cause" must be my concern? What's good, what's bad? Why, I myself am my concern, and I am neither good nor bad. Neither has meaning for me. The divine is God's concern; the human, man's. **My concern is neither the divine nor the human, not the true, good, just, free, etc., but solely** what is mine [das **Meinige**] , and it is not a general one, but is - **unique [einzig], as I am unique. Nothing is more to me than myself! […]Selfish love** is far distant from unselfish, mystical, or romantic love. One can love everything possible, not merely men, but an "object" in general (wine, one's fatherland, etc.). Love becomes blind and crazy by a must taking it out of my power (infatuation), romantic by a should entering into it, by the "objects" becoming sacred for me, or my becoming bound to it by duty, conscience, oath. **Now the object no longer exists for me, but I for it.** Love is a possessedness, not as my feeling - as such I rather keep it in my possession as property - but through the alienness of the object. For religious love consists in the commandment to love in the beloved a "holy one," or to adhere to a holy one; for unselfish love there are objects absolutely lovable for which my heart is to beat, such as fellow-men, or my wedded mate, kinsfolk, etc. Holy Love loves the holy in the beloved, and therefore exerts itself also to make of the beloved more and more a holy one (a "man"). The beloved is an object that should be loved by me. He is not an object of my love on account of, because of, or by, my loving him, but is an object of love in and of himself. Not I make him an object of love, but he is such to begin with; for it is here irrelevant that he has become so by my choice, if so it be (as with a fiancée, a spouse, and the like), since even so he has in any case, as the person once chosen, obtained a "right of his own to my love," and I, because I have loved him, am under obligation to love him forever. He is therefore not an object of my love, but of love in general: an object that should be loved. Love appertains to him, is due to him, or is his right, while I am under obligation to love him. My love, the toll of love that I pay him, is in truth his love, which he only collects from me as toll.

### Rights Discourse

#### The affirmative’s drive to affirm human rights turns them into the humanitarian with a guillotine – perfecting the world justifies an infinite cycle of interventionism that leads to eradication of the other.

**Zizek 06** – lol (Slavoj, “Against Human Rights”, 10/9/06; <http://libcom.org/library/against-human-rights-zizek>)//Beddow

It is within this context that we can situate the most salient human rights issue: the rights of those who are starving or exposed to murderous violence. Rony Brauman, who co-ordinated aid to Sarajevo, has demonstrated how the very presentation of the crisis there as ‘humanitarian’, the very recasting of a political-military conflict into humanitarian terms, was sustained by an eminently political choice—basically, to take the Serb side in the conflict. The celebration of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Yugoslavia took the place of a political discourse, Brauman argues, thus disqualifying in advance all conflicting debate. [9] From this particular insight we may problematize, at a general level, the ostensibly depoliticized politics of human rights as the ideology of military interventionism serving specific economico-political ends. As Wendy Brown has suggested apropos Michael Ignatieff, such humanitarianism presents itself as something of an anti-politics, a pure defence of the innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defence of the individual against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy, and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power against individuals. [10] However, the question is: what kind of politicization do those who intervene on behalf of human rights set in motion against the powers they oppose? Do they stand for a different formulation of justice, or do they stand in opposition to collective justice projects? For example, it is clear that the us-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein, legitimized in terms of ending the suffering of the Iraqi people, was not only motivated by hard-headed politico-economic interests but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic conditions under which ‘freedom’ was to be delivered to the Iraqi people: liberal-democratic capitalism, insertion into the global market economy, etc. The purely humanitarian, anti-political politics of merely preventing suffering thus amounts to an implicit prohibition on elaborating a positive collective project of socio-political transformation. At an even more general level, we might problematize the opposition between the universal (pre-political) human rights possessed by every human being ‘as such’ and the specific political rights of a citizen, or member of a particular political community. In this sense, Balibar argues for the ‘reversal of the historical and theoretical relationship between “man” and “citizen”’ that proceeds by ‘explaining how man is made by citizenship and not citizenship by man.’ [11] Balibar alludes here to Arendt’s insight on the condition of refugees: The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships except that they were still human. [12] This line, of course, leads straight to Agamben’s notion of homo sacer as a human being reduced to **‘bare life’**. In a properly Hegelian dialectics of universal and particular, it is precisely when a human being is deprived of the particular socio-political identity that accounts for his determinate citizenship that—in one and the same move—he ceases to be recognized or treated as human. [13] Paradoxically, I am deprived of human rights at the very moment at which I am reduced to a human being ‘in general’, and thus become the ideal bearer of those ‘universal human rights’ which belong to me independently of my profession, sex, citizenship, religion, ethnic identity, etc. What, then, happens to human rights **when they are the rights of homo sacer, of those excluded from the political community**; that is, when they are of no use, since they are the rights of those who, precisely, have no rights, and are treated as inhuman? Jacques Rancière proposes a salient dialectical reversal: ‘When they are of no use, one does the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. One gives them to the poor. Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes and rights.’ Nevertheless, they do not become void, for ‘political names and political places never become merely void’. Instead **the void is filled by somebody or something else: if those who suffer inhuman repression are unable to enact the human rights that are their last recourse, then somebody else has to inherit their rights in order to enact** them in their place. This is what is called the ‘right to humanitarian interference’—a right that some nations assume to the supposed benefit of victimized populations, and very often against the advice of the humanitarian organizations themselves. The ‘right to humanitarian interference’ might be described as a sort of ‘return to sender’: the disused rights that had been sent to the rightless are sent back to the senders. [14] So, to put it in the Leninist way: what the ‘**human rights of Third World suffering victims’ effectively means today, in the predominant discourse, is the right of Western powers themselves to intervene politically, economically, culturally and militarily in the Third World countries of their choice, in the name of defending human rights**. The reference to Lacan’s formula of communication (in which the sender gets his own message back from the receiver-addressee in its inverted, i.e. true, form) is very much to the point here. In the reigning discourse of humanitarian interventionism, the developed West is effectively getting back from the victimized Third World its own message in its true form. The moment human rights are thus depoliticized, the discourse dealing with them has to change: the pre-political opposition of Good and Evil must be mobilized anew. Today’s ‘new reign of ethics’, clearly invoked in, say, Ignatieff’s work, thus relies on a violent gesture of depoliticization, depriving the victimized other of any political subjectivization. And, as Rancière points out, liberal humanitarianism à la Ignatieff unexpectedly meets the ‘radical’ position of Foucault or Agamben with regard to this depoliticization: their notion of ‘biopolitics’ as the culmination of Western thought ends up getting caught in a kind of ‘ontological trap’, in which concentration camps appear as ontological destiny: ‘each of us would be in the situation of the refugee in a camp. Any difference grows faint between democracy and totalitarianism and any political practice proves to be already ensnared in the biopolitical trap’. [15] We thus arrive at a standard ‘anti-essentialist’ position, a kind of political version of Foucault’s notion of sex as generated by the multitude of the practices of sexuality. ‘Man’, the bearer of human rights, is generated by a set of political practices which materialize citizenship; ‘human rights’ are, as such, a false ideological universality, which masks and legitimizes a concrete politics of Western imperialism, military interventions and neo-colonialism. Is this, however, enough?

### Case

#### Identity politics obscures structural violence

**Farmer 9** United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for Community-based Medicine and Lessons from Haiti, Kolokotrones University Professor at Harvard University (Paul Farmer, Autumn 2009, “On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below,” Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts, Volume 3, Number 1, Project Muse)//KP

None of this is to deny the ill effects of sexism or racism, even in the wealthy countries of North America and Europe. The point is merely to call for more fine-grained and systemic analyses of power and privilege in discussions of who is likely to suffer and in what ways. The capacity to suffer is, clearly, part of being human. But not all suffering is equal, in spite of pernicious and often selfserving identity politics that suggest otherwise. One of the unfortunate sequelae of identity politics has been the obscuring of structural violence, which metes out injuries of vastly different severity. Careful assessment of severity is important, at least to physicians, who must practice triage and referral daily. What suffering needs to be taken care of first and with what resources? It is possible to speak of extreme human suffering, and an inordinate share of this sort of pain is currently endured by those living in poverty. Take, for example, illness and premature death, in many places in the world the leading cause of extreme suffering. In a striking departure from previous, staid reports, the World Health Organization now acknowledges that poverty is the world's greatest killer: "Poverty wields its destructive influence at every stage of human life, from the moment of conception to the grave. It conspires with the most deadly and painful diseases to bring a wretched existence to all those who suffer from it."28 As the twentieth century draws to a close, the world's poor are the chief victims of structural violence—a violence which has thus far defied the analysis of many seeking to understand the nature and distribution of extreme suffering. Why might this be so? One answer is that the poor are not only more likely to suffer; they are also more likely to have their suffering silenced. As Chilean theologian Pablo Richard, noting the fall of the Berlin Wall, has warned, "We are aware that another gigantic wall is being constructed in the Third World, to hide the reality of the poor majorities. A wall between the rich and poor is being built, so that poverty does not annoy the powerful and the poor are obliged to die in the silence of history."29 [End Page 25] The task at hand, if this silence is to be broken, is to identify the forces conspiring to promote suffering, with the understanding that these will be differentially weighted in different settings. In so doing, we stand a chance to discern the forces motrices of extreme suffering. Asound analytic purchase on the dynamics and distribution of such affliction is, perhaps, a prerequisite to preventing or, at least, assuaging it. Then, at last, there may be hope of finding a balm in Gilead.30

#### The aff’s stigmatization of Europe as the sole evil oversimplifies the world situation – conversely it raises Europe’s arrogance as the martyr that drives the world while ignoring other non-European problems

Bruckner **10** French writer (Pascal, 2010, *A Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism*, pg. 34-36, translated by Steven Rendall)

Thus we Euro-Americans are supposed to have only one obligation: endlessly atoning for what we have inflicted on other parts of humanity. How can we fail to see that this leads us to live off self-denunciation while taking a strange pride in being the worst? Self-denigration is all too clearly a form of indirect self-glorification. Evil can come only from us; other people are motivated by sympathy, good will, candor. This is the paternalism of the guilty conscience: seeing ourselves as the kings of infamy is still a way of staying on the crest of history. Since Freud we know that masochism is only a reversed sadism, a passion for domination turned against oneself. Europe is still messianic in a minor key, campaigning for its own weakness, exporting humility and wisdom.6 Its obvious scorn for itself does not conceal a very great infatuation. Barbarity is Europe’s great pride, which it acknowledges only in itself; it denies that others are barbarous, finding attenuating circumstances for them (which is a way of denying them all responsibility).¶ Thus it wants to be the sole seat of inhumanity in action and wears this evil disposition as its insignia as others wear their decorations. Even natural catastrophes do not escape our delusions of grandeur: there are always many analysts who see in the slightest hurricane, flood, or earthquake the perfidious hand of Euro-America. Regarding the tsunami in December 2004, some even saw the goddess Gaia rising from the ocean floor to punish our industrial civilization. Like prayer, self-accusation is a way of acting symbolically at a distance when one can do nothing. Megalomania without borders: by attributing all the misfortunes of the world to man, a certain kind of ecology shows an unbridled anthropocentrism that confirms our status as the “master and destroyer” of the planet. To think, for example, that tomorrow we will be able to determine whether we have rain or sunshine, that we will eclipse nature, is to relapse into the Promethean fantasy nourished by the most fanatical adepts of progress. We can, then, contest everything except our own depravity. A blatant case of imperialism in reverse. Decolonization has deprived us of our power, our economic influence is constantly decreasing, but in a colossal overestimation we continue to see ourselves as the evil center of gravity on which the universe depends.¶ We need our clichés about the wretchedness of Africa, Asia, and Latin America to confirm the cliché about the predatory, murderous West. Our loud stigmatizations serve only to mask this wound to our self-esteem: we no longer make the laws. Other cultures know it but nonetheless continue to blame us in order to escape our judgment and call us, at the slightest tremor, “people in pith helmets telling other people what to do” (Vladimir Putin). If colonial independence’s record of achievement is at present problematic, there is no doubt that someday Africa will take off, and the Arab world as well, that they will cease to be objects of our compassion and become direct competitors, partners on equal terms. Then we will no longer be the “masters of the world” but only formerly well-off people with pale faces. The whole paradox of a sobered-up Europe is that it is no less arrogant than imperial Europe because it continues to project its categories on the rest of the world and childishly boasts that it is the origin of all the ills that beset mankind. Our superiority complex has taken refuge in the perpetual avowal of our sins, a strange way of inflating our puny selves to global dimensions.

#### Reject the affirmative to recognize the potential positive effects of the status quo order – penitence is a political act – the result is the crime of indifference in the face of atrocities – we have the obligation to promote freedom instead

Bruckner **10** French writer (Pascal, 2010, *A Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism*, pg. 34-36, translated by Steven Rendall)

History offers us a twofold lesson: that a people can die, and that a people can be reborn, that human communities sometimes emerge from the worst aberrations greater than ever before, providing us with examples of admirable resurrection. Two philosophies thus conflict in us: one is a source of fear and despair, the other a source of courage and endurance. The former overwhelms us with the irremediable, the latter frees us from it and calls upon us to reject fatalism. Confidence is like taking chances and prophesying, it is a will to take responsibility for our own future, an aptitude for leaping beyond doubt and fear, for gathering strengths we didn’t know we had. In Spinoza’s terms, it is an increase in power, the certainty that the world is a secure place where I can develop myself fully. To recover confidence is to rediscover capacities for action that multiply by themselves, whereas excessive cautiousness gives rise to fear and a shriveling of ambitions. The only debt we owe to people we have persecuted, apart from the recognition of these persecutions, is to promote the extension of democratic regimes or at least to accelerate the erosion of despotism. Our obligation is not to remain silent, out of embarrassment, when these same peoples fall in their turn into arbitrary rule or oppression, but to prevent everywhere the return of humiliations and butchery. Let us recall Raymond Aron’s observation, which the whole work of the great Indian economist Amartya Sen seems to illustrate: the main obstacle to development is not the economic system, no matter how harsh it might be, but rather the lack of freedom, of a sense of the public interest and concern for public welfare. Europe has to have done with fanaticism and modesty: if it cannot swallow up the world with a big spoon, it has to take its share and remain the singular voice that speaks for justice and law, and acquires the military and political means to make that voice heard. This responsibility increases in the degree that we also assume that democracy draws sustenance from the belief in democracy when it bears and incarnates its values with determination. If it limits itself to moderation alone, it is in danger of exhausting itself. Penitence is ultimately a political choice: that of an abdication that in no way immunizes us against wrong. The fear of returning to our former errors makes us too indulgent with regard to contemporary infamies. The crime of interfering is replaced by the crime of indifference.

#### Too many structural barriers to solve disposability

**Lindberg-Aganga, 11 –** (Amanda, Washington College of Law, “Disposable Victims: How the TVPA Fails to Protect Victims of Human Trafficking,” ExpressO, 2011, http://works.bepress.com/amanda\_lindberg-aganga/1)//HO

Despite naming **victim protection** as one of the three major goals of the TVPA, the reality **has fallen far short of the kinds of protections that should** and can **be made available to victims** in the United States. **Victims who are identified and whose traffickers face prosecution may** sometimes **not be eligible for** long-term **T-visa status and other protections. Authorities fail to identify thousands of victims each year. Those that are** identified still **face** **red tape, and victims who have** committed crimes or **been forced to commit crimes through their trafficking experience may be prosecuted** for those crimes, **creating tension between the priority of prosecuting perpetrators of trafficking and often coerced immigration offences.¶** This paper argues that **Congress’ approach** to and subsequent execution of victim protection through the TVPA and reauthorization bills **has undermined one of the foundational purposes** of the TVPA: **to provide protection and assistance to victims of trafficking. This shortfall is the result of multiple factors, including insufficient training of** immigration and **law enforcement officials, unnecessary barriers between victims and services, and** a **tension between immigration policy and the aims of the TVPA** vis-à-vis assisting victims. First, I will frame the issue of human trafficking in the United States today, and then will discuss the TVPA’s legislative background and text. Part IV will argue that **mechanisms for gathering data and refining victim identification are insufficient.** Part V proposes that **even once victims are identified, there are** unnecessary and **unconscionable barriers to assisting many victims.** Part VI concludes with recommendations to improve victim identification and services throughout the victim’s contact with United States authorities and service providers, recalling that a victim’s experience does not end with the conviction of his or her trafficker.

#### Focus on international trafficking trades off with protection for US citizens forced into sexual slavery

**STRAUSS 2010** (Lindsay, B.A., The University of Michigan, 2007; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2010, Spring, 19 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 495)

Although international trafficking has garnered more federal attention than domestic trafficking, the similarities between the two are startling, and thus require a reframing of the issue of human trafficking. With the passage of The White Slave Traffic Act (Mann Act) in 1910, the phrase "traffic in women and children" was used to demarcate "white slavery," or international trafficking, from local prostitution. 69 This demarcation focused attention on international trafficking victims and diverted it away from the continuing enslavement of American women in local prostitution. 70 The TVPRA of 2005, however, was amended in part to draw attention to the fact that, under the TVPA, foreign trafficking victims are treated as victims while American trafficking victims are treated as criminals. 71 Because of this disparate treatment, American domestic trafficking victims do not receive the services they need to free themselves from an abusive industry. 72 Like international trafficking victims, most of the women and children who work as prostitutes in the United States do so against their will. 73 For example, they are forced into prostitution because of the brutal [\*507] tactics of their pimps, who are responding to the high demand for sexual services. 74 Pimps, like international traffickers, often control the victims' identification, money, and freedom, and use physical and psychological abuse to further control their prostitutes. 75 Through sleep deprivation, sexual and physical violence, learned helplessness, false promises, and favors, pimps create a cycle of abuse and affection, which creates a trauma bond between the pimp and the victim. 76 Pimps actively exploit this bond in order to force women to prostitute for them. 77 Moreover, these women, like foreign victims, are often already vulnerable to exploitation because of poverty or past abuse. 78 For instance, it is well known that women in the United States and abroad, on average, make less money than their male counterparts and have, due to societal norms, fewer economic alternatives. 79 In addition, many of these women are homeless, have children to support, or suffer from drug addiction. 80 [\*508] Thus, many women enter prostitution and stay in prostitution due to economic necessity. In addition, an estimated eighty percent of the prostitutes in America began working as children, 81 and sixty to seventy percent of them have histories of childhood sexual abuse, 82 which pimps exploit for financial gain. 83 Pimps often promise these women a new life or a new job to lure them into prostitution, similar to the false promises used by international traffickers. 84 Furthermore, like numerous foreign trafficking victims, many domestic victims come from unstable homes. 85 Their parents often abandon them, or they run away due to sexual or physical abuse. 86 Although the parents of domestic trafficking victims may not sell them to pimps outright, as some foreign victims' families do, 87 the victims' vulnerable position on the streets lead about 40,000 of the estimated 1.6 million runaway children each year to become involved with sex trafficking. 88 The similarities between domestic and international trafficking victims are striking, and it is clear that both groups need to be thought of as victims - worthy of assistance and protection - and not as criminals.

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**Our interpretation is that the affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of a topical plan in which the United States federal government substantially increases development and/or exploration beyond the Earth’s mesosphere. The role of the ballot is to determine whether the hypothetical benefits of the implementation of the plan outweigh the negative consequences of the plan.**

**The affirmative violates this—they don’t defend a hypothetical instance of the resolution**

**Vote negative—**

**Predictable limits——the resolution is the only common denominator all teams share—that’s critical to big-small team fairness and research—no predictable stasis point causes shallow research that focuses on framework at the expense of space-specific education**

**Fairness—It’s a two way street—refusal to defend the resolution as the point of debate silences the negative—undermines research, is disrespectful and undermines debate—that’s Galloway**

**And, it is a pre-condition for debate to occur**

**Shively, 2000** – Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M

(Ruth Lessl, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2)

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### A stable point of stasis is critical to deliberative argument.

**Deliberative Argument Requires Agreement on the Question at Hand as a Precondition to Debate**

Adolf G. **Gundersen,** Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, **2000**

POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

**D) Deliberative argument is essential to prevent marginalization and violence. The aff’s move to ignore this because it could exclude perspectives disregards the spectrum of power relationships.**

Mari **Boor Tonn,** Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, 20**05**

(“Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public” Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 8, No. 3)

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan “The Personal Is Political” to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model’s emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan’s landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues— models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as “elitist” or “monologic”—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate “in what we call the reality-based community.” Such people “believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality.” Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: “That’s not the way the world really works anymore . . . We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality— judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, “A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its ‘surgical’ proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function.” The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, “is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts.”104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the “heart” of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

**Topical version of the aff—plan plus scifi analogy—proves there’s no unique reason to endorse their framework**

**Fairness outweighs—reciprocal norms are crucial to inclusion of both teams—it’s the only way to scrutinize and refine arguments—that’s Galloway—that is the central mission of debate—we will not be policy makers, but argumentation and research skills we learn from debate are the only things we take from the activity after we leave—a lack of fairness straight turns their project—**

**Jurisdiction—Topicality is an a-priori voting issue–as judge you are only allowed to affirm those policies within your jurisdiction dictated by the resolution—even if we lose framework, you still vote negative**

**And, their advantages can’t be separated from framework—their utopian imagination is not based on topical USFG action—if we win framework, you vote negative on presumption because their advantages are illegitimate.**

**And, new impact—**

**Resolutional debate key to student participation—empirically confirmed**

**Preston, 3 –** professor of communication at the University of Missouri - St. Louis (C. Thomas, “No-Topic Debating in Parliamentary Debate: Student and Critic Reactions,” <http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf>)

The study involved forty-three students and nine critics who participated in a parliamentary debate tournament where no topic was assigned for the fourth round debates. True to the idea of openness, no rules regarding the topic were announced; no topic, or written instructions other than time limits and judging instruction, were provided. In this spirit, the participants first provided anecdotal reactions to the no-topic debate, so that the data from this study could emerge from discussion. Second, respondents provided demographic data so that patterns could be compared along three dimensions. These dimensions, the independent variables for the student portion of the study, involved three items: 1) level of debate experience; 2) whether NPDA was the only format of parliamentary debate the students had experienced; and 3) whether students had participated in NDT or CEDA policy debate. Third, the questions were to determine how students rated the debates based on criteria for good debate-educational value, clash, and a fair division of ground. Students were also asked two general questions: whether they would try the no-topic debate again, and whether they liked the no-topic round. These questions constituted the dependent variables for the student study. Because the sample was small, descriptive statistical data were gathered from critics. Taking into account the experience of the critics, additional questions concerning items such as whether no-topic debating deepened discussion. Both students and critics were asked which side they thought the no-topic approach favored, and the students with NDT/ CEDA policy debating experience were asked if a no-topic debating season would be good for policy debate. For the objective items, critics and students were asked to circle a number between 1 and 7 to indicate the strength of reaction to each item (Appendix I and Appendix II). In scoring responses, the most favorable rating received the highest score of seven and the least favorable rating a score of one. In some instances, values that were circled on the sheet were reversed such that the most favorable reaction to that category received the higher score. Frequency distributions and statistics were then tabulated for each question, and the anecdotal remarks were tabulated. For the student empirical data, t-tests were conducted to determine whether overall debate experience, NPDA experience, or policy experience affected how the students reacted to an item. As a test for significance, p was set to less than or equal to .05. **Results** *Student responses to Specific Questions.* The frequency of the student responses to questions, with descriptive statistics the results from each question, are indicated in the following five tables: **(Tables omitted)** With regard to the 22 students who indicated some experience with NDT/CEDA policy debate, the following frequency resulted in responses concerning the extent to which students felt that no-topic debating would be a good experiment for the year of NDT/CEDA debating: **(Tables omitted)** Finally, of the 43 responses, 35, or 81.4 per cent, felt that the no-topic debate skewed the outcome of the debate toward one side or the other. Of those responses, 32 (91.4 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 74.4 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Government. Three (8.6 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 7.0 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Opposition.For the overall student data, each the mean of each item was slightly below 4.0, but mostly, the kurtosis figures were negative, and the standard deviations high, indicating a bipolar response to each question. The frequency tables bear out strong negative reactions, but a number of positive reactions which tended to be less strong. On the one hand, a substantial number of students and critics felt very strongly that the experience **was negative**, with the mode=1 for each item on the survey; however, on others, a substantial number of respondents rated aspects of the experience at 4 and above. The educational value had the highest central tendencies (mean=3.65, median=4.0, and mode=1.0), whereas the question over whether the students liked the experience was the lowest (mean=3.19, median=3.0, mode=1.0). Although there was a weak positive pole to the responses, those who had NDT/CEDA experience strongly opposed the idea of a no-topic year of debating in those organizations (mean=2.77, median =1.00, mode=1.00). When the responses were compared based on degree of parliamentary debate experience, whether or not the student's background was solely in NPDA parliamentary debate, or whether or not the student has policy (NDT or CEDA) debate background, the data revealed three patterns: 1) For every question, the mean ratings by those with experience were lower than those without experience, but that difference was not significant at the p<=.05 level. 2) For every question, the mean ratings by those who had parliamentary debating experience only in NPDA were lower than those with NPDA experience only. In each case, these findings were significant a the p<=.05 level. NPDA-only debaters differed most from those with other experience most in responding to the question of whether they would try the experiment again. For this question, the mean response was 4.6 for those with other experience, and 2.22 for those only with NPDA experience, with t = -3.69 (p = .00034). NPDA-only debaters differed least from others on the question of whether the debate promoted more clash. Here, the mean response was 3.0 for those with NPDA experience only, and 4.35 for the other group, with t = -2.01, (p = .03). For each question, those with other experience rated the experience above the expected value of 4, and those with NPDA only experience rated the experience at 3.0 or lower as a mean. Finally, 3), whether or not a student had participated in NDT or CEDA debate in each case made no statistically significant difference in how favorably a student rated any of the items. All of the means were below 4.0 for each group for each question. Student Anecdotal Remarks. Reflecting their numerical responses to the specific survey items, students wrote 31 statements opposed to the non topic idea, 10 comments indicated the idea might work with an improvement in procedures, and 13 in favor of the experience. Fifteen of the 43 respondents declined to offer any anecdotal remarks. The most common types of remarks included: **(table omitted)** Students reacting negatively tended to write more comments per student than those who ratings were more positive, however. In any event, an examination of these type comments indicates a strong bipolar reaction to the no topic round, skewed slightly toward those opposing the idea. Some remarks strongly attacked the experiment: "perhaps the most ridiculous notion for debate ever," "two thumbs down," "who needs that nonsense?," "worst parli experiment ever," "this is the most ridiculous round I have ever participated in", "this was a stupid waist [sic] of time," and "**the single least educational or entertaining debate experiment in my life" were among such reactions.** Others took the opportunity to attack other debate organizations: "I feel that that this form of debate could be abused even worse than CEDA ever thought about being!!!!!," "This must be some idea of a silly APDA geek. . .if I wanted to run pre-conceived cases (b/c this one was all policy, like most), I'd be wearing "Birks" and beads in CEDA," "Might as well be CEDA," "The bridge you attempt to build between APDA and NPDA is unbelievably silly. It will never work," and "policy should be kept in CEDA" exemplified such remarks. Some students reporting that they had debated many parliamentary rounds, all NPDA, wrote some of the strongest negative remarks and even suggested more restrictions on resolutions. The following exemplified this reaction: "For us old-timers, we are deeply offended and I am hopeful that this will not happen in the future. Maybe resorting to more specific resolutions rather than creating easy ways out of setting up good round would be a much better solution."

**The alternative is community backlash**

**Preston, 3 –** professor of communication at the University of Missouri - St. Louis (C. Thomas, “No-Topic Debating in Parliamentary Debate: Student and Critic Reactions,” <http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf>)

First, the idea proved more unpopular than popular among the student sample. For each of the questions, the mean of the overall sample was less than the expected score of 4.0, and the mode score (the value appearing most often) for the overall student response was 1.0 for every category. Although the standard deviation (from the mean), skewness (difference from a normal distribution) and kurtosis (height of the curve) statistics indicated a wide variety of different answers, a substantial proportion of the sample reacted vehemently against the no topic idea. Second, critics did not seem particularly fond of the idea. They, too, offered a mean score of less than four on all of the questions they were asked. Although the medians and mode answers mostly indicated a softer reaction to the experiment among the critics against the idea, there were some who went so far to say that they would not attend another tournament with a no-topic round. Although the results from this study came from one event at a particular time, they indicate some possibility of a backlash should this experiment be tried again. The risk of alienation, however, appears to be much less in terms of hosting tournaments where the bulk of the attendees would be APDA participants. Also, for tournament administrators who feel that they can afford to continue an educational dialog on the benefits of offering debate rounds with no proscribed topic, two other options exist based on this study. If a tournament director considers either of these options, the director should consult both the current bylaws of APDA and NPDA. As of this writing, the APDA bylaws regarding resolutions leave the decision of how to manage topics up to individual tournament directors. Perhaps explaining why the strongest negative reactions came from NPDA debaters, the NPDA may require permission to offer no-topic rounds before NPDA will sanction the tournament. At a minimum, the plans for any no-topic round should be explained clearly—and prominently—in the invitation under Options II and III below. To be safe, considering the current bylaws of NPDA, directors should notify NPDA of plans to conduct any no-topic rounds with the request for sanctioning.

**Seriously, people will stop debating.**

**Preston, 3 –** professor of communication at the University of Missouri - St. Louis (C. Thomas, “No-Topic Debating in Parliamentary Debate: Student and Critic Reactions,” <http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf>)

Reduced to absurdity, the notion of no rules for a debate tournament would result in chaos, bringing up an infinite regress into whether or not chaos is a good thing! At least on the surface, the results of this particular study would seem to discourage repeating this experiment as conducted for the present study. A number of participants may not want to return to the tournament because of the confusion and perceived lack of educational value. However, an exact representation and t-tests between results could help not only assess the validity and reliability of the instrument, but whether attitudes and perceptions have changed toward no-topic debating. Therefore, whereas Option III may seem to be out of the questions, benefits can still be gained from it in terms of studying the evolution of parliamentary debate format.

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### Overview

#### Their morality is rooted in false Christian and Enlightenment assumptions that are self-alienating and oppressive.

**Newman 09** – Post-Anarchist philosopher, Reader in Political Theory at University of London (Saul, “War on the State: Stirner and Deleuze’s Anarchism” < http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-war-on-the-state-stirner-and-deleuze-s-anarchism>)

For Stirner discourses such as morality and rationality are fixed ideas or spooks. They are apparitions, ideological abstractions that nevertheless have real political effects — they provide the State with a formal justification for its domination. Koch argues that Stirner’s attack on fixed ideas represents a decisive break with the transcendentalism of Western thought, exposing the power behind these dominant ideas and “transcendental masks” (Koch 1997:101). **This power has become abstracted from the individual and is held over him**. The dominance of morality, for instance, is fundamentally linked to political power, preserving the continued existence of the police State (Stirner 1993:241). For Stirner morality is not only a fiction derived from Christian idealism, but also a discourse that **oppresses the individual**. It is based on the desecration of the individual will — the ego. Morality is merely the leftover of Christianity, only in a new humanist garb: “Moral faith is as fanatical as religious faith!” (Stirner 1993:46). Morality has become the new religion — a secular religion — demanding the same unquestioning obedience. For Stirner, the State is the new Church — the new moral and rational authority wielded over the individual (Stirner 1993:23). Similarly rationality may also be seen as a discourse which perpetuates State power. Rational truths are always held above individual perspectives and this is another way of subordinating the individual ego to an abstract power above him or her. As with morality, rational truth has become sacred, absolute, removed from the grasp of the individual (Stirner 1993:353). So for Stirner, morality and rationality are discourses of the State, and their function, rather than to liberate us from domination, is to further subordinate the individual to State power. Therefore, according to Stirner, in order to wage war on the State one must also wage war on the principles which provide political power with a moral and rational foundation.

#### K turns case - A truly ethical individual must reject the morality of the aff; it only masks an ideology of self-enslavement.

**Newman 02** - Post-Anarchist philosopher, Reader in Political Theory at University of London (Saul, “Max Stirner and the Politics of Posthumanism”, 2002, < http://www.scribd.com/doc/20244495/Newman-S-Max-Stirner-and-the-Politics-of-Post-Humanism>)

Moreover, for Stirner, ethical action does not necessarily depend on there being a fixed, stable identity, or an identity that is dialectically mediated. On the contrary, the possibility of ethics would depend on the very openness, contingency and instability of identity that his critics denounce. **Ethical action would involve questioning morality, unmasking the domination behind it. It would involve an ethical critique of morality in other words**. For Stirner, an ethical self is a self that **eschews a fixed moral and rational identity**, remaining instead unfixed and open to change and contingency. This is Stirner’s political and ethical identity of resistance: it is political, not because it affirms a predetermined political or moral stance, but rather because it rejects all such fixed positions and the oppressive obligations attached to them.

#### 2. The K comes first – the individual process of Becoming is the only good to be affirmed and is incompatible with the affirmative’s moralism.

**Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy**. First published Thu Jun 27, 2002; substantive revision Tue Aug 23, **2011**. *http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/max-stirner/.*

Stirnerian egoism is perhaps best thought of, not in terms of the pursuit of self-interest, but rather as a variety of individual self-government or autonomy. **Egoism properly understood is to be identified with what Stirner calls ‘ownness [*Eigenheit*]’, a type of autonomy which is incompatible with any suspension, whether voluntary or forced, of individual judgement.** “I am my own”, Stirner writes, “only when I am master of myself, instead of being mastered … by anything else” (153). This Stirnerian ideal of self-mastery has external and internal dimensions, requiring both that **we avoid subordinating ourselves to others and that we escape being ‘dragged along’ (56) by our own appetites**. In short, Stirner not only rejects the legitimacy of any subordination to the will of another but also recommends that individuals cultivate an ideal of emotional detachment towards their own appetites and ideas. Judged against this account of egoism, **characterisations of Stirner as a ‘nihilist’—as rejecting all normative judgement—would also appear to be mistaken**. The popular but inaccurate description of Stirner as a ‘nihilist’ is encouraged by his explicit rejection of morality. Morality, on Stirner's account, involves the positing of obligations to behave in certain fixed ways. As a result, he rejects morality as incompatible with egoism properly understood. However, this rejection of morality is not grounded in the rejection of values as such, but in the affirmation of what might be called non-moral goods. That is, Stirner allows that **there are actions** and desires which, although not moral in his sense (because they do not involve obligations to others), **are** nonetheless **to be assessed positively.** Stirner is clearly committed to the non-nihilistic view that **certain kinds of** character and modes of **behaviour** (namely autonomous individuals and actions) **are** **to be valued** **above** all **others**. His conception of morality is, in this respect, a narrow one, and his **rejection of the legitimacy of moral claims is not to be confused with a denial of the propriety of all normative judgement**. There is, as a result, no inconsistency in Stirner's frequent use of an explicitly evaluative vocabulary, as when, for example, he praises the egoist for having the ‘courage’ (265) to lie, or condemns the ‘weakness’ (197) of the individual who succumbs to pressure from his family. Two features of Stirner's position emerge as fundamental. First, he **values ‘ownness’ neither as one good amongst many, nor as the most important of several goods, but rather as the only good**. Second, he adopts an account of self-mastery which is incompatible with the existence of any legitimate obligations to others, even those which an individual has voluntarily undertaken (thereby rejecting perhaps the most familiar way of reconciling individual autonomy with the existence of binding obligations). In short, Stirner appears to **value nothing other than** individual **self-mastery**, and he interprets the latter in a stringent and idiosyncratic manner.

### Education

#### True educational value comes from the individualistic methodology of the Kritik – only by rejecting the slavish morality of the aff can we attain self knowledge. The affirmative’s humanist and realist educational paradigm only retrenches the Verstimmung we criticize.

**Stirner 42** – German philosopher (Max, nom de plum of Johann Kaspar Schmidt, “The False Principle of Our Education”, 1842)

For what reason then do the realists show themselves so unfriendly toward philosophy? Because they misunderstand their own calling and with all their might want to remain restricted instead of becoming unrestricted! **Why do they hate abstractions**? **Because they themselves are abstract since they abstract from the perfection of themselve**s, from the elevation to redeeming truth! Do we want to put pedagogy into the hands of the philosophers? Nothing less than that! They would behave themselves awkwardly enough. It shall be entrusted only to those who are more than philosophers, who in that respect are infinitely more even than humanists or realists. The latter are on the right scent in that even the resurrection will follow their decline: they abstract from philosophy in order to reach their heaven full of purpose without it, they leap over it, and — fall in the abyss of their own emptiness; they are, like the eternal Jew, *immortal*, not *eternal*. **Only the philosophers can die and find in death their true self; with them the period of reformation, the era of knowledge dies. *Yes, so it is that knowledge itself must die in order to blossom forth again in death as will*;** the freedom of thought, belief, and conscience, these wonderful flowers of three centuries will sink back into the lap of mother earth so that a new freedom, the freedom of will, will be nourished with its most noble juices. Knowledge and its freedom were the ideal of that time which has finally been reached on the heights of philosophy: here the hero will build himself a pyre and will rescue his eternal part in Mount Olympus. With philosophy, our past closes and the philosophers are the Raphaels of the era of thought with which the old principle perfects itself in a bright splendor of colors and 19 through rejuvenation is changed from transient to eternal. Henceforth, **whoever wants to preserve knowledge will lose it; he, however, who gives it up will gain it.**[+] **The philosophers alone are called to this giving-up and to this gain**: they stand in front of the flaming fire and, like the dying hero, must burn their mortal body if the immortal spirit is to be free. As much as possible it must be more intelligibly stated. Therein indeed lies the ever recurring mistake of our day, that knowledge is not brought to completion and perspicuity, that it remains a material and formal, a positive thing, without rising to the absolute, that it loads us down like a burden. Like the ancients, one must wish for forgetfulness, must drink from the blessed Lethe: otherwise one does not come to ones senses. Everything great must know how to die and transfigure itself through its death; only the miserable accumulates like the frozen-limbed supreme court,10 heaps documents upon documents, and plays for the millenia in delicate porcelain figures, like the immortal childishness of the Chinese. **Proper knowledge perfects itself when it stops being knowledge and becomes a simple human drive once again, — the wil**l. So, for example, he who has deliberated for many years about his "calling as a human being," will sink all care and pilgrimage of seeking in one moment in the Lethe of a simple feeling, of a drive which from that hour in which he has found the former gradually leads him. The "calling of man" which he was tracking down on a thousand paths and byways of research bursts as soon as it has been recognized into the flame of ethical will and inflames the breast of the person who is not distracted any longer with seeking but has again become fresh and *natural*. […]And **all of this because education is sought only in its formal or material aspects, at the most, in both; not in truth, in the education of the *true* man**. The realists do indeed make progress when they demand that the student should find and understand that which be learns: Diesterweg,12 for example, knows how to talk a great deal about the "Principle of experience"; but the object is not the truth, even here, but rather some sort of positive thing (as which religion must also be considered), to which the student is led to bring into agreement and coherence with the sum of his other positive knowledge without raising it at all above the crude state of experience and contemplation, and without any incentive to work further with the *mind* which he has gained by contemplation and *out* of it to produce, that is, to be speculative, which from a practical standpoint implies as much as to be moral and to behave morally. On the contrary, to educate *rational* people, that should be sufficient; it is not really intended for *sensible* people; to understand things and conditions, there the matter is ended, — ***to understand oneself* does not seem to be everyman's concern**. Thus sense is promoted for the positive whether it be according to its formal side or at the same time according to its material side, and teaches: to reconcile oneself to the positive. In the pedagogical as in certain other spheres freedom is not allowed to erupt, the power of the *opposition* is not allowed to put a word in edgewise: they want *submissiveness*. Only a formal and material training is being aimed at and only scholars come out of the menageries of the humanists, only "useful citizens" out of those of the realists, both of whom are indeed nothing but *subservient* people. […]If my conclusion is to express in a few words which goal our time has to steer toward, then the necessary decline of non-voluntary learning **and rise of the self-assured will which perfects itself in the glorious sunlight of the free person may be expressed somewhat as follows: *knowledge* must die and rise again as *will* and create itself anew each day as a free *person*.14**

# 1nr

### Rights Discourse

#### Empirics prove K turns their ethics claims – the aff’s poor are just problems to be solved; this duty generates hatred for those who suffer.

**Rothbard 93** – American economist, historian, political theorist, philosopher, libertarian anarchist (Murray N., “Doing God’s Work”, March 1993.)//Beddow

The real evil – this crusading spirit itself – first swept over America in the late 1820s in the form of what is technically called "post-millennial pietism" (PMP). In the dominant "evangelical" form that PMP assumed in the "Yankee" communities of the North (New Englanders and their transplanted kin in upstate New York, northern Ohio, northern Indiana, etc.), this meant that every man had the bounden and overriding duty to maximize the salvation of his fellowmen, by stamping out sin and the temptations thereto. In short, he was bound to work his darndest to establish a Christian Commonwealth, a Kingdom of God on Earth. It very quickly became clear that sin was not going to be stamped out very quickly by purely voluntary means, and so the PMPers rapidly turned to government to do the stamping out and the creating and the uplifting. In short, as one historian perceptively put it, for the PMPers, "government became God's major instrument of salvation." This turn to government was facilitated by the "pietist" part of the PMP doctrine, for this meant that the old Puritan emphasis on creed and God's Law, much less the Catholic or Lutheran emphasis on liturgy or the sacramental Church, was swept aside. Christianity became totally focused in a vaguely pietist, "born again," mood on the part of each basically creedless and Church-less individual soul. Shorn of Church or creed, the individual PMPer was necessarily forced to lean upon government as his staff and shield. Slowly but surely over the decades since 1830, this mainstream Yankee Protestantism became secularized into an only vaguely Christian but passionately held Social Gospel. After all, with this sort of mindset, it was easy for God to gradually drop from sight, and for government to assume a quasi-divine role. It was left to the monster Woodrow Wilson, a PMPer to his very bones and a Ph.D. as well, to take this domestic creed and extend it to foreign policy. It was essentially a "today the U.S., tomorrow the world" credo. Once the PMPers took over the U.S. government and imposed a Kingdom of God at home, their religious duty got raised to the planetary level. As the historian James Timberlake put it, once the Kingdom of God was being established in the United States, it became "America's mission to spread these ideals and institutions abroad so that the Kingdom could be established throughout the world. American Protestants were accordingly not content merely to work for the kingdom of God in America, but felt compelled to assist in the reformation of the rest of the world." (James Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 1900–1920, New York, Atheneum, 1970, pp. 37–38) Since Woodrow Wilson, every American president has followed faithfully in the footsteps of the Wilsonian creed. The content of the Kingdom of God to be imposed on other nations may have changed slightly (from alcohol prohibition and coerced global "democracy" in Wilson's day to smoking prohibition, free condoms, and global democracy in our own) but the form and the spirit remain all too much the same. In the February Triple R, we blasted the Somalian invasion and cited Isabel Paterson's perceptive and prophetic denunciation of the "Humanitarian with the Guillotine." Now, in an uncanny, unconscious echo of Paterson, Michael Maren writes a chilling and significant article in the leftist Village Voice ("Manna from Heaven: Somalia Pays the Price for Years of Aid," Jan. 19) about his own experiences as an American aid worker in Somalia in the early 1980s. Before that, Maren had spent four years as a leading relief worker in Kenya. From his African experience, Maren learned a crucial fact about the African polity: that the urban technocratic and bureaucratic ruling class in the African countries (generally educated in Marxism in the imperial motherland) **has nothing but total contempt for the productive peasant classes** off whom this ruling elite battens. **To the ruling elite, which taxes, controls, and coerces the peasantry, the peasantry are scum to be "modernized**"; particularly scorned are the often prosperous tribal, cattle-raising nomads, whose nomadic way of life seems to be a constant reproach to Marxoid technocrats intent on emulating Stalin and forcing their rural populace into the "twentieth century." Maren had seen thousands of the nomadic Turkana tribe starve in Kenya, largely due to the policies of the Kenyan officialdom, who would "exploit the starving (Turkanas) by offering to trade small amounts of donated relief food for the hides of their animals, the last remaining things of value the refugees owned...Ultimately it dawned on me that the suit-wearing, tea-sipping, Europhile politicians in Nairobi didn't really give a s\_\_t about the 'primitive' nomadic people in the north."

#### No, you’re not different – the basis of your entire philosophy is democide.

**Paterson 43** – journalist, author, political philosopher, critic, ‘founding mother’ of American libertarianism (Isabel, “The Humanitarian with the Guillotine”, excerpted from *The God of the Machine,* 1943; < http://mises.org/daily/2739>)//Beddow

Certainly the slaughter committed from time to time by barbarians invading settled regions, or the capricious cruelties of avowed tyrants, would not add up to one-tenth the horrors perpetrated by rulers with good intentions. As the story has come down to us, the ancient Egyptians were enslaved by Pharaoh through a benevolent scheme of "ever normal granaries." Provision was made against famine; and then the people were forced to barter property and liberty for such reserves which had previously been taken from their own production. The inhuman hardness of the ancient Spartans was practiced for a civic ideal of virtue. The early Christians were persecuted for reasons of state, the collective welfare; and they resisted for the right of personality, each because he had a soul of his own. Those killed by Nero for sport were few compared to those put to death by later emperors for strictly "moral" reasons. Gilles de Retz, who murdered children to gratify a beastly perversion, killed no more than fifty or sixty in all. Cromwell ordered the massacre of thirty thousand people at once, including infants in arms, in the name of righteousness. Even the brutalities of Peter the Great had the pretext of a design to benefit his subjects. The present war, begun with a perjured treaty made by two powerful nations (Russia and Germany), that they might crush their smaller neighbors with impunity, the treaty being broken by a surprise attack on the fellow conspirator, would have been impossible without the internal political power which in both cases was seized on the excuse of doing good to the nation. The lies, the violence, the wholesale killings, were practiced first on the people of both nations by their own respective governments. It may be said, and it may be true, that in both cases the wielders of power are vicious hypocrites; that their conscious objective was evil from the beginning; nonetheless, they could not have come by the power at all except with the consent and assistance of good people. The Communist regime in Russia gained control by promising the peasants land, in terms the promisers knew to be a lie as understood. Having gained power, the Communists took from the peasants the land they already owned — and exterminated those who resisted. This was done by plan and intention; and the lie was praised as "social engineering," by socialist admirers in America. If that is engineering, then the sale of fake mining stock is engineering. The whole population of Russia was put under duress and terror; thousands were murdered without trial; millions were worked to death and starved to death in captivity. Likewise the whole population of Germany was put under duress and terror, by the same means. With the war, Russians in German prison camps, Germans in Russian prison camps, are enduring no worse and no other fate than that their compatriots in as great numbers have endured and are enduring from their own governments in their own countries. If there is any slight difference, they suffer rather less from the vengeance of avowed enemies than from the proclaimed benevolence of their compatriots. The conquered nations of Europe, under the Russian or German heel, are merely experiencing what Russians and Germans have been through for years, under their own national regimes. Further, the principal political figures now wielding power in Europe, including those who have sold their countries to the invader, are socialists, ex-socialists, or communists — men whose creed was the collective good. With all this demonstrated to the hilt, we have the peculiar spectacle of the man who condemned millions of his own people to starvation admired by philanthropists whose declared aim is to see to it that everyone in the world has a quart of milk. A graduate professional charity worker has flown half around the world to seek an interview with this master of his trade, and to write rhapsodies on being granted such a privilege. To keep themselves in office, for the professed purpose of doing good, similar idealists welcome the political support of grafters, convicted pimps, and professional thugs. This affinity of these types invariably reveals itself, when the occasion arises. But what is the occasion? Why did the humanitarian philosophy of 18th-century Europe usher in the Reign of Terror? It did not happen by chance; it followed from the original premise, objective, and means proposed. The objective is to do good to others as a primary justification of existence; the means is the power of the collective; and the premise is that "good" is collective. The root of the matter is ethical, philosophical, and religious, involving the relation of man to the universe, of man's creative faculty to his Creator. The fatal divergence occurs in failing to recognize the norm of human life. Obviously **there is a great deal of pain and distress incidental to existence. Poverty, illness, and accident are possibilities which may be reduced to a minimum, but cannot be altogether eliminated from the hazards mankind must encounter**. But these are not desirable conditions, to be brought about or perpetuated. Naturally children have parents, while most adults are in fair health most of their lives, and are engaged in useful activity which brings them a livelihood. That is the norm and the natural order. Ills are marginal. They can be alleviated from the marginal surplus of production; otherwise nothing at all could be done. Therefore it cannot be supposed that the producer exists only for the sake of the nonproducer, the well for the sake of the ill, the competent for the sake of the incompetent; nor any person merely for the sake of another. (The logical procedure, if it is held that any person exists only for the sake of another, was carried out in semibarbarous societies, when the widow or followers of a dead man were buried alive in his grave.) The great religions, which are also great intellectual systems, have always recognized the conditions of the natural order. They enjoin charity, benevolence, as a moral obligation, to be met out of the producer's surplus. That is, they make it secondary to production, for the inescapable reason that without production there could be nothing to give. Consequently they prescribe the most severe rule, to be embraced only voluntarily, for those who wish to devote their lives wholly to works of charity, from contributions. Always this is regarded as a special vocation, because it could not be a general way of life. Since the almoner must obtain the funds or goods he distributes from the producers, he has no authority to command; he must ask. When he subtracts his own livelihood from such alms, he must take no more than bare subsistence. In proof of his vocation, he must even forego the happiness of family life, if he were to receive the formal religious sanction. Never was he to derive comfort for himself from the misery of others. The religious orders maintained hospitals, reared orphans, distributed food. Part of such alms was given unconditionally, that there might be no compulsion under the cloak of charity. It is not decent to make a man strip his soul in return for bread. This is the real difference when charity is enjoined in the name of God, and not on humanitarian or philanthropic principles. If the sick were cured, the hungry fed, orphans cared for until they grew up, it was certainly good, and the good cannot be computed in merely physical terms; but such actions were intended to tide the beneficiaries over a period of distress and restore them to the norm if possible. If the distressed could partly help themselves, so much the better. If they could not, that fact was recognized. But most of the religious orders made a concurrent effort to be productive, that they might give of their own surplus, as well as distributing donations. When they performed productive work, such as building, teaching for a reasonable fee, farming, or incidental industries and arts, the results were lasting, not only in the particular products, but in enlargement of knowledge and advanced methods, so that in the long run they raised the norm of welfare. And it should be noted that these enduring results derived from self-improvement. What can one human being actually do for another? He can give from his own funds and his own time whatever he can spare. But he cannot bestow faculties which nature has denied; nor give away his own subsistence without becoming dependent himself. If he earns what he gives away, he must earn it first. Surely he has a right to domestic life if he can support a wife and children. He must therefore reserve enough for himself and his family to continue production. No one person, though his income be ten million dollars a year, can take care of every case of need in the world. But supposing he has no means of his own, and still imagines that he can make "helping others" at once his primary purpose and the normal way of life, which is the central doctrine of the humanitarian creed, how is he to go about it? Lists have been published of the neediest cases, certified by secular charitable foundations which pay their own officers handsomely. The needy have been investigated, but not relieved. Out of donations received, the officials pay themselves first. This is embarrassing even to the rhinoceros hide of the professional philanthropist. But how is the confession to be evaded? If the philanthropist could command the means of the producer, instead of asking for a portion, he could claim credit for production, being in a position to give orders to the producer. Then he can blame the producer for not carrying out orders to produce more. If the primary objective of the philanthropist, his justification for living, is to help others, his ultimate good requires that others shall be in want. His happiness is the obverse of their misery. If he wishes to help "humanity," the whole of humanity must be in need. The humanitarian wishes to be a prime mover in the lives of others. He cannot admit either the divine or the natural order, by which men have the power to help themselves. The humanitarian puts himself in the place of God. But he is confronted by two awkward facts; first, that the competent do not need his assistance; and second, that the majority of people, if unperverted, positively do not want to be "done good" by the humanitarian. When it is said that everyone should live primarily for others, what is the specific course to be pursued? Is each person to do exactly what any other person wants him to do, without limits or reservations? and only what others want him to do? What if various persons make conflicting demands? The scheme is impracticable. Perhaps then he is to do only what is actually "good" for others. But will those others know what is good for them? No, that is ruled out by the same difficulty. Then shall A do what he thinks is good for B, and B do what he thinks is good for A? Or shall A accept only what he thinks is good for B, and vice versa? But that is absurd. Of course what the humanitarian actually proposes is that he shall do what he thinks is good for everybody. It is at this point that the humanitarian sets up the guillotine. What kind of world does the humanitarian contemplate as affording him full scope? It could only be a world filled with breadlines and hospitals, in which **nobody retained the natural power of a human being to help himself or to resist having things done to** **him**. And that is precisely the world that the humanitarian arranges when he gets his way. When a humanitarian wishes to see to it that everyone has a quart of milk, it is evident that he hasn't got the milk, and cannot produce it himself, or why should he be merely wishing? Further, if he did have a sufficient quantity of milk to bestow a quart on everyone, as long as his proposed beneficiaries can and do produce milk for themselves, they would say no, thank you. Then how is the humanitarian to contrive that he shall have all the milk to distribute, and that everyone else shall be in want of milk? There is only one way, and that is by the use of the political power in its fullest extension. Hence the humanitarian feels the utmost gratification when he visits or hears of a country in which everyone is restricted to ration cards. Where subsistence is doled out, the desideratum has been achieved, of general want and a superior power to "relieve" it. **The humanitarian in theory is the terrorist in action.** The good people give him the power he demands because they have accepted his false premise. The advance of science lent it a specious plausibility, with the increase in production. Since there is enough for everybody, why cannot the "needy" be provided for first, and the question thus disposed of permanently?

### Case

#### Vote negative to repent and forget about the harms of the past – only then can we encourage the mingling of cultures – solves the entirety of the aff

**Bruckner 10** French writer (Pascal, 2010, *A Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism*, pg. 34-36, translated by Steven Rendall)

But history consists as much of collective forgetting as it does of memory; it abolishes the blood debts societies contract among themselves. If we had to continue the quarrels of our predecessors, if all peoples had to ruminate their respective grievances, the world would be given over to fire and blood. That is why there is something very profound in Ernest Renan’s remark that “Someone who has to make history has to forget history.” We have to abandon the idea of reparations for each and every past injury: the tortured, the defeated, the belittled will not be avenged, no financial compensation will bring them back to life.14 What is owed them is the historical truth, not an insatiable desire for punishment on the part of their descendants. We cannot go on forever using suffering to make demands on the future; the time of prosecution has to come to an end after a few generations, once the biological duration has been respected, and to make room for the work of the researcher. There comes a time when we have to let the dead bury the dead, taking with them their dissensions and their woes. Focusing on what separates us rather than on what unites us is always dangerous. Oblivion is what makes room for the living, for newcomers who want to wipe away the obligations of the past and not bear the burden of ancient resentments. It is a power of beginning again for future generations. The best victory over the exterminators, torturers, and slave traders of yesterday is the coexistence that is now possible among peoples and ethnic groups that prejudices and mentalities previously declared to be incompatible, it is that formerly dominated people are now treated as equals and engaged in a collective adventure. In each of our nations, millions of people have to learn to live together with differing histories. Their ancestors killed each other for reasons that today seem obscure or repugnant. They can continue to mistrust each other, live alongside each other and compete in sad passions; or they can abandon vindictiveness in favor of a will to get along, as we see in certain exceptional moments. “What is good about soccer in France is that people celebrate French players without asking whether they are black or not. Just because they are French” (Lilian Thuram). The ideal would be to arrive at an indifference to color, ethnic group, and identity, seeing only talents, proper names, individual strengths, exceptional persons rather than individuals crammed into fixed categories. We are not there yet, not in Brazil and not in the United States, but these two great multiracial countries are showing the way. We should be working on enlarging the human family, not on sanctifying past sufferings, which is always degrading for those who complain about them. To accomplish this task, good will is not enough. We need a whole politics of friendship, of benevolent sympathy: we need a miracle.